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THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS
Over a century ago, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that "medicine, professedly founded on observation, is as sensitive to outside influence, political, religious, philosophical, imaginative, as is the barometer
to the atmospheric density." In theory, "it ought to go on its own
straightforward inductive path," he continued, but in practice there exists
"a closer relation between the Medical Sciences and the conditions of
Society and the general thought of the time, than would at first be
expected."1 Holmes's piercingly accurate insight has never been so
broadly and energetically probed as it is in the encyclopedic work at
hand. The Encyclopedia of Bioethics (EB)2 indeed goes well beyond
medicine. The work is considerably more than an encyclopedia of medical
ethics. The four volumes range over the ethics of human life with major
exemplification in medical and health-related concerns. Mustered into
this sweeping effort are philosophy, theology, history, anthropology,
sociology, psychology, biology, and law. Traditional and modern problems
of medical ethics are treated, such as artificial insemination, organ
transplant, in vitro fertilization, contraception, mercy death, experimentation on human and animal subjects, and abortion. But there is also
concern with racism, sexism, nuclear deterrence, ecology, and the just
distribution of goods and bads in the political processes of planet earth.
In other words, EB is predicated on the assumption that medical problems are broader than medicine and that medical problems are often not
soluble by merely medical means. For human life to survive and even
thrive a little, it must meet practical and philosophical challenges that
cannot be met by one discipline or one world view. For this reason, EB
draws from and explores the major religious traditions, some classical
ethical theories, and various problematics that the human mind has
marshaled to interpret and enhance human terrestrial existence. The
result is therefore broader than any specialization. Indeed, it is not an
overstatement to say that all of those who are concerned with how the
human mind comes to know moral truth—whether their interest be
professional or lay—are in the debt of Warren T. Reich, who directed
this remarkably successful venture.
I

The work was from the outset a good idea. Bioethics represents a
confluence of human value concerns. The rush to bioethics (some 1500
1

The Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Riverside edition, Vol. 9, Medical Essays
1842-1882 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1891) 177.
2
Editor in chief, Warren T. Reich. 4 vols. New York: Free Press; London: Collier
Macmillan 1978. Pp. xxxix + 1933. $200.
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significant items are published annually in this area in English alone)
involves a revolutionary development in moral consciousness. The blinding positivistic poisons are belatedly blowing out to sea. The term "valuefree science" ominously entered the philosophical vocabulary in the
middle of the nineteenth century, while the Western world was drunk on
the prospects of scientific genius. With it came what Eric Voegelin called
"the positivistic conceit that only propositions concerning facts of the
phenomenal world [are] 'objective,' while judgments concerning the right
order of soul and society [are] 'subjective.' " 3 Philosophy succumbed to
this pollution by naively sanctioning the separation of fact and being
from moral value. In some sorry instances, philosophers segregated
morality from the realm of genuine knowledge or confined its business to
linguistic dissection and to a narrow pursuit of notional clarity at the
expense of wisdom, breadth, and depth.
Life is tolerant of such errors only for a time. Eventually the distinctly
moral problems rising up from the physical and social sciences pressed
their way toward center stage, and the new enterprise of bioethics was
upon us. To greet this development with an encyclopedia was both fitting
and timely.
An encyclopedic viewing of such a field should be more than an
information retrieval service, and this one is. It is an event of theory, an
enabling scholarly achievement which in many areas clarifies the "state
of the question," raises presuppositional questions, and promotes an
atmosphere of broad-based and critical analysis. EB is not an unqualified
success; no encyclopedia has been or could be. So Promethean an effort
is at times inevitably foiled in its noble pretentiousness. Yet the overall
success of this work is nothing short of outstanding.
Most importantly, and in a way that is paradigmatic for relating any
particular discipline to ethics, EB meets its prime obligation by conducting a multileveled assault on the idea that human affairs are ever
conducted in a value-free vacuum. This is done not just in the analysis of
justice, rights, natural law, and other common categories of ethics. It is
also woven into the treatment of particular concerns such as attitudes
toward the future, paternalism, embodiment, intelligence testing, and
cost-benefit analysis. As the embodiment article drives home convincingly, "every medical practice, no matter how trivial, is to begin with
value-laden, which means that each one either explicitly or (most often)
implicitly is expressive of some vision of what is or is thought to be
morally good— The primary issue for bioethics.. .is to educe, to make
explicit, the 'ways of construing the world' found in ongoing medical
interventions and patient-responses." Medicine is called upon to acknowl3
Eric Voegelin, The New Science ofPolitics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago,
1952) 11.
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edge the "incorporation of ethical notions in each of its practices, and the
necessity of having to assess these in their own terms as such" (365). An
encyclopedia of ethics and politics, for example, could take EB as an
exemplification of the job to be done in analyzing explicit and implicit
moral assumptions operating on supposedly neutral turf.
EB is also laudable in that it does not opt for a chaste detachment
from controversy nor does it eschew tough-minded judgment of debated
issues. Thus, in its excellent treatment of racism and medicine, the
encyclopedia cites the historical role of medicine in bolstering and elaborating racist attitudes. Medical scientists proffered theories of blacks as
an inferior and disease-prone race and argued, to the joy of racist whites,
that Negroes were a vanishing race. The article on racism and medicine
goes on to name names, noting that all of this "was given further credence
when the nation's leading life insurance companies, led by Prudential, all
but refused to write policies for Negroes" (1406-7). Physicians also, under
the banner of scientific objectivity, "hammered away at the black man's
distaste for honest labor, fondness for alcohol, proclivity to crime and
sexual vices, disregard for personal hygiene, ignorance of the laws of good
nutrition, and total indifference to his own health" (1407). Medicine
offered a view of blacks as "diseased, debilitated, and debauched," with
only themselves to blame (ibid.). Blacks and poor people continue to
supply a disproportionate share of the subjects used in experiments, and
the article concludes with these two blunt assessments: "The vast majority of physicians never regarded the race question as an ethical issue for
medicine." "Most of the progress that has been made on the racial front
in medicine to date has been in response to pressures from outside the
profession" (1409).
The article on racism and mental health is equally direct. It cites the
tendency to use psychological theories and biased tests to prove racial
inferiority. Specifically, it notes of the prestigious Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory that it "was standardized by using normal groups
of white men and women—no blacks were included. The hint of racism
is easily suggested inasmuch as the test has separate norms for males
and females because of modal differences in their personalities, and yet
modal differences are not unlike nor as great as those existing between
blacks and whites" (1412). The article cites the "ludicrous proposition
(held as true by many) that all blacks are, at least partially, mentally ill"
(1411). EB does not subscribe to the prevalent view that objectivity
requires afinessingof the unpleasant.
EB stands as lucid proof of the impossibility of doing ethics in isolation
from other disciplines. No two disciplines are created equal nor are any
two disciplines identical in their intrinsic relatedness to other disciplines.
Ethics, however, is unique in its natural ecumenism. Indeed, ethics is not
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just one of the lot of disciplines. Discerning the moral, i.e., discerning
that which befits and enhances the human, is a massive and complex
enterprise, requiring input and collaboration from all who explore the
various dimensions of the unfolding human mystery. Ideally, ethics in a
university setting would not be a department or part of a department.
Rather, it would be located in a center for the study of moral values
where ethicists would offer the methodology for ethical inquiry and foster
and formalize interdisciplinary evaluative collaboration among all departments. Not by ethical theory alone is ethics done.
EB illustrates this special nature of ethics in convincing ways. Take,
for example, its excellent treatment of human sexuality. There are articles
on sex therapy and sex research, empirical studies on sexual behavior,
psychosexual development, the history of sexual ethics, and the question
of sexual and gender identity. A reading of these articles and their rich
bibliographical suggestions supports the contention that anyone attempting to theorize about the meaning of human sexuality, while ignoring the
input of psychology, history, and empirical research, is poorly grounded.
Nor should this approach seem alien or threatening to those long accustomed to more deductive and unilateral approaches to the sexual phenomenon. Catholics and others who have espoused the "procreative and
unitive" rubric for understanding sex willfindthe conclusion of the sexual
behavior article congenial: "The most important characteristic of sex may
finally be that it is so deeply intertwined with affection and that it is still
the chief human instrument for making progeny, and these may suggest
some limits on its exercise, though they do not reveal the contents of
those limits" (1568). Those who fear the demoralization of sex achieved
by current hedonism will welcome the conclusion of the sexual-development article: "Sexuality in human beings is so locked into forms of
learning which are essential to moral development that it is inextricable
from them"; and "sexual development is the ground for one of the central
lines of moral development, namely the capacity for valuing another
organism as a person" (1574).
None of the disciplines that treat the human phenomenon may fruitfully dwell in "splendid isolation"fromits peer disciplines. Arnold Toynbee was certainly indulging in the elder statesman's prerogative for
winking overstatement when he wrote: "The study of human affairs is, in
truth, monolithic. The dissection of this mental monolith into the socalled 'disciplines' is, at the best, a convenient operational device, while,
at its worst—that is to say, if it is taken as being a reflexion of reality—it
is a distortion of the truth."4 However, he was offering hyperbolic
4

Arnold J. Toynbee, Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time (New York and
London: Oxford University, 1966) 89.
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correction of the disciplinarily segmented approach to truth. Stripped of
hegemonic claims, such as theology made in the past and the social
sciences are prone to make today, the disciplines could all benefit from
Toynbee's chiding and also from St. Paul's masterful epistemologica!
insight that it is only "in part" that any of us knows. EB is a solid
example of interdisciplinary co-operation.
Another notable strength oîEB is its strong sense of the instructiveness
of history, as exemplified in the 97,000-word entry on the history of
medical ethics. This entry, which is a book unto itself, is fascinating
reading and suggests both the relativity and the enduring meaning of
some of the problems that consume medical ethics today. This entry
moves from studies of primitive societies, through the Near and Middle
East, Africa, south and east Asia, Europe, and the Americas. It is a feast
of cross-cultural experience, asidefromits specific focus on medical ethics
and practice.
Briefly and selectively, there are other strengths in EB. The treatment
of abortion is balanced and is not the febrile issue in the encyclopedia
that it is in contemporary debate in the United States. In this way EB
fulfils its role in suggesting the proper significance of this serious issue.
Also, the article on obligation and superobligation suggests a new perspective for the abortion debate. Avoiding the absolutist negation of any
and all abortions regardless of circumstances and a bland and deceptive
neutrality regarding the issue, this article suggests that at least in some
cases "while abortion may not be prohibited by the strict sense of
obligation, the better and higher way would consist in preserving and
nurturing human life, with its potential and actual values, whenever
feasible. In this way one could discourage recourse to abortion as much
as possible without condemning those who choose to abort on reasonable
grounds." It is suggested that in this way "the concept of superobligation
promises a grace and poise to ethical reasoning that it would not otherwise
have" (1152). Manifestly, the abortion debate could, among other things,
do with more grace and poise.
The articles on Roman Catholic directives in medical ethics and on
Roman Catholicism both do well to include the traditional approach of
probabilism. Probabilism grounded the legitimate pluralism of Catholic
ethics, stating that there isfreedomof conscience when there is genuine,
not frivolous, doubt regardingrigorousmoral absolutism. It is a system
which should not be neglected, since it is a liberating and humanizing
achievement of our Catholic theological forebears and has deep roots in
the pneumatology of the Christian Scriptures and in the theology of the
discernment of the Spirit. It is the necessary antidote, as EB notes, to
such things as the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Facilities issued by the U.S. Bishops, which ignores this rich Catholic
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legacy and seems innocent of the very possibility of pluralism. It is also
a necessary corrective today for the absolute tutiorism implicit in much
of the oracular magisteriology which still abides at every level of the
Church.
Finally, EB counters two dangers that are inherent in the new area of
bioethics: issue-hopping ethics and clubbing. Regarding issue-hopping,
the primary role of the ethicist is at the level of theory and method. To
be a person is to be an evaluator; to be an ethicist is to discern and
explicitate the method proper to that evaluation. Moving from particular
issue to particular issue without unpacking and elaborating one's method
is imperfect service from an ethicist. The plethora of mind-teasing chal
lenges in the area of bioethics has been a temptation for the hopping
instinct of the ethicist. The diffuse concern of EB for methodological
matters gives good example to bioethicists, who should show whence
they come and what methodological presuppositions they carry with
them. EB was well guided in this regard.
Regarding clubbing, this is a too little recognized tendency in any field
to indulge a grouping instinct, with consequent outgrouping of those who
are not received. Involved in clubbing is the development of an orthodoxy,
an unofficial but influential curia, even papal figures. The prime danger
of clubbing in any discipline is the establishing of a false consensus and
the banishing of creative dissent. It would seem almost impossible to find
a field in which this phenomenon is not to some degree operative. New
fields like bioethics and the centers that serve it and become sources of
policy advice may too easily be prey to indentured bias. (The conservative
attitude on in vitro fertilization in EB, and the near silence on psycho
somatic and wholistic health, might signal biases in the United States
bioethics club.) EB in its overall thrust, however, is not clubbish. It
reaches out broadly and draws contributors from contradictory perspec
tives.
At the level of format and structure, ΕΒ is exemplary. The bibliograph
ical apparatus is excellent and often helpfully annotated. The indexing
was well done and the print would be gentle even to aging eyes. The
appendix of codes and statements related to medical ethics is highly
useful. It includes general codes for the practice of medicine stretching
from Hippocrates to the statement of the British Medical Association in
1974, directives for human experimentation, the various patients' bills of
rights, and the codes of specialty health-care associations.
II

Given the successes of EB> one laments any need for serious criticism,
and yet some such criticism is justly due. I turn first to the twelve-article
entry on ethics, obviously a central contribution to this work. The main
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fear that grips creators of encyclopedias is the fear of premature obsoleteness. In my judgment, this entry is the prime candidate in this
encyclopedia for obsoleteness, since it is already obsolescent. The entry
is top-heavily cast in the rationalistic and analytical mold that much
moral philosophy, particularly of the British persuasion, has too long
preferred. As a result, the entry drags us through debates and categories
that should long since have been interred, were they not being prolonged
on certain philosophical respirators. Someone going to EB for a formal
look into ethics will come awayfromthis entry with a notion of ethics as
a tediously rationalistic undertaking. There we read: "Most contemporary
ethical theorists agree that correct moral judgments are those that would
be arrived at by impartial rational persons (sympathy is no longer
regarded as necessary)" (439). In one example of thisfleshlessunderstanding of reason, the valuing person "cannot use any fact about himself that
distinguishes himfromany other person." And "he must make his moral
decision as if he knew nothing about the identity of the various
parties involved" (440). In other words, we must strain to think of moral
reasoning as stripped of affect and experiential immersion, huddled
behind a "veil of ignorance," reaching for a mathematical abstractness in
moral choice and judgment. In such a "rationality," which involves more
of a gaming technique than an epistemology of ethics, there is no room
for the mystical and the affective. There are no mystics behind the "veil
of ignorance," only calculating, self-interested, rationalistic persons of
"lean and hungry look."
Moral knowledge is grounded in an appreciation of what persons are
worth in all of their mysterious unfolding preciousness. However essential
the service of practical and speculative reasoning in ethics—and essential
indeed that service is—affection is still the animating mold of moral
knowledge. The roots of moral knowledge are contemplative and tied to
a faith experience of the value of persons. One would sense none of this
in the pages of this entry. Here if one can make nothing coherent of
Hume's "sympathy," or if one shrinks from emotivism and moral-sense
simplisms, then affect has no epistemological credentials. The affective,
mystical, and contemplative dimensions of moral experience and knowledge must be left aside in the search for a detached and antiseptic
rationality.5 Other traditions, certainly including the Thomistic tradition
with its concept of "affective knowledge" of the good and the holy, have
grappled with this perplexing but unavoidable dimension of moral knowledge, but they are not represented in this major entry. Indeed, in this
5
For a fuller development of this than I can give here, see my The Moral Choice (New
York: Garden City, 1978) chap. 3. I further develop this in "Ratio Practica and the
Intellectualiste Fallacy," a Hoover Lecture given at the University of Chicago which, prior
to its publication, I would make available to readers upon request.
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entry, as in much of the literature of moral philosophy and Protestant
theological ethics, one would suspect that if you have made reference to
Thomas Aquinas and the natural law, you have paid adequate scholarly
attention to the Catholic tradition of ethical epistemology. The age of
"ecumenical ethics" has been all too prematurely proclaimed.
Of the twelve articles in the Ethics entry, most are in the analytical
tradition and spirit. Moore's Principia etìlica is the mostfrequentbibliographical entry, and the confusing "naturalistic fallacy," about which not
even Moore was clear, keeps bobbing before us. What truly would be lost
if this confused category were commended to the archives of the history
of ethics? What relief awaits moral philosophy if it could in a blessed
kenosis concur with philosopher H. Girvetz when he writes: "That a book
as barren of results as Moore's Principia could be regarded as one of the
important works of this century is perhaps a measure of the desperate
state of contemporary moral philosophy."6
Teleology and deontology are taken as though they were inevitable
and useful categories, though it is becoming increasingly apparent to
many that they are no more successful than Sidgwick's trichotomy of
intuitionism, egoism, and utilitarianism, which they were intended to
replace.
Another defect in this entry must be noted. The article on deontological
theories speaks of "Hebrew-Christian ethics," "the Hebrew-Christian
ideal," and "the Hebrew-Christian tradition" and "the Hebrew-Christian
conception" regarding deontology. This is loose talk, since there is no
such "Hebrew-Christian" amalgam with a single view of deontology in
existence. It is difficult to think of any issue on which one could indiscriminately lump Hebrew and Christian together as a supposed unitary
viewpoint. The traditions are too rich and varied. The article offends
further by alleging that this "Hebrew-Christian" view sees "the ideal life
for man as obedience to the will of God, or to some positive law or rule
believed to express that will, whatever may be the individual's own plans
or desires," and that in "Hebrew-Christian" thought "the right thing for
one to do is to submit to someone else's will" (413). This is a glaring
inaccuracy concerning the nature of moral obligation in the Christian and
Hebrew traditions. One winces at such a caricature when one thinks of
the richness of the theologies of the reign of God, the imago Dei, the
indicative and imperative dimensions of Christianly-conceived morality,
the law of the Spirit, the nature of hesed and agape, the "theonomous
conscience," and, in Aquinas' phrase, the Christian as a "participator in
divine providence." Hebrews and Christians would recoil further from
the unnuanced contention that the Kantian "stress on certain uberai
6

Harry K. Girvetz, Beyond Right and Wrong (New York: Free Press, 1973) 116.
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values, such as autonomy,freedom,dignity, self-respect, and the respect
for individual rights" is "incompatible ... with the Hebrew-Christian
conception of the ideal life" (414). Such errors should not have slipped
through the editorial dragnet.
There are two special ironies in the orientation of this Ethics entry.
First, medical ethics in this country was primarily developed by theological ethicists, who were concerned with both the clarification of problems
and their solutions, and yet the authors here are, overwhelmingly, moral
philosophers of the analytical bent who are by trade less than concerned
with solutions. Secondly, the current move away from this analytical
approach is being stimulated, among other things, by the new interest in
bioethics and by the new sense that the metaethicists are of very limited
help in this area.
There is another large problem in EB which is not the fault of this
encyclopedia but of contemporary philosophical and theological ethics.
This is the absence of a coherent theory of justice. This absence is indeed
noted in EB: "If systematic judgments about the relative position of
competing rights claims and duties can be made in any coherent and
intelligent fashion, it is necessary to develop a coherent theory of justice.
Such a theory has either not yet evolved or has not yet been recognized,
nor do we propose to develop one here" (390). This, of course, is no minor
disclaimer. Certainly, bioethics is concerned with nothing else than
making systematic judgments about the relative position of competing
claims and duties. The acknowledgment that the state of the art makes
this impossible is a major embarrassment. EB could have served here by
offering an extensive and multifaceted entry on the history and theory of
justice. There is, indeed, an article on justice, and there are articles on
rights and related matters. Also, justice questions abound throughout.
Yet a fuller and more unified treatment of justice was indicated by the
nature of the work. Justice is not just one virtue among many. It is rather
the elementary and minimal articulation of what is due to persons and
their environment. Justice is the prime business of bioethics. Well does
Aristotle say that friends have no need of justice. For them, the higher,
more generous dynamism of love supplies. But outside the intimacy of
friendship (and most bioethical concerns are located outside that intimacy), justice is the bulwark against cruelty. Justice seeks the minimal
due of persons and environment. A coherent theory of justice, therefore,
is no luxury. Absent such a theory, theoretical and practical mischief
inevitably reigns. Justice is the first fruit of the foundational moral
experience of the value of persons and their environment. Thus any
theory of rights is predicated on a theory of justice, which in turn is
predicated upon a foundational anthropology. And in this is the rub.
"Rights" is a big category in EB. It would be an interesting study to
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discern how many anthropologies and moral presuppositions lurk beneath
the varied uses of this term even in this work.
Some of the authors in EB are quite mindful of the hazards of rights
talk. "The indiscriminate use of the concept of 'right' to solve any and
every moral problem" is cited (401). Also, "The proliferation of rights
claims results in a weakening of the moral binding power of all rights
language by sheer reiteration" (390). The relative newness of reliance on
this usage is also mentioned: "It is only within the past three centuries
that the emergence and general spread of the notion of rights has taken
place" (1512). And yet the largest categorial item in ethics in the Index
of EB is Rights. The hazards of rights language in EB and in current
ethical, political, and legal discourse merit attentive scrutiny.
First, it is necessary to recognize that the category of rights, as used in
contemporary ethics, is an upper-level term reflecting several layers of
presupposition, ideology, and theory. In American parlance the term
frequently bodies forth a ruggedly individualistic and asocial ideology, a
"me vs. you and them" viewpoint. Conversations conducted at the level
of one rights claim vs. another are regularly superficial. In the abortion
debate, the right-to-life faction and the right-to-choice faction do not
even achieve intelligible disagreement. The proclaimed rights do not
touch the foundations of the issue. The debate is frequently like that
thirteenth-century conversation between the Mongol leader Kuyuk Khan
and Pope Innocent IV. Mongol expansion was imperiling the Christian
West. The Pope sent a message to the Mongol court demanding that they
receive baptism and submit to papal authority. Kuyuk Khan was bewildered. He replied that by the "virtue of God" all realms had been granted
to his forces. It was the Pope, said the Khan, who should be submitting.
"This, your request," said Kuyuk Khan, "we do not understand!"7
In contemporary terms this altercation might be cast as a contest of
rights, but this would indeed be superficial. It was not a tidy issue of who
had the right to command whom. World views and religious, cultural,
and anthropological assumptions were in contention. Rights talk would
scarcely scratch the surface of this encounter.
Similarly, debate on abortion fixated at the level of rights claims (as it
is not fixated in EB) is but scratching the surface. Similarly, the right to
death with dignity, the right to confidentiality, the right to know, the
right to conduct low-risk medical experimentation on children, the right
to limit freedom, the right to refuse blood transfusions or to insist on
them are all proclamations that must be taken to their foundations. No
two are the same nor will the argumentation for any two of them be
identical. Implicit in much of rights language is a cryptic intuitionism.
7

See Voegelin, The New Science of Politics 56-58.
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Rights tend to be proclaimed as self-evident truths, and the work of
ethics to establish those rights is left undone.
Secondly, rights talk easily leads to a one-rubric ethics. This is well
illustrated in constitutional law. There a singleright,therightto privacy,
for example, becomes the short-cut solution for the most disparate moral
problems. Under the privacy rubric, claims are made to a right to
abortion, to contraception, to not wearing a helmet while motorcycling,
and even to wearing one's hair as one chooses. In each case there is an
enormous hidden agenda that is not addressed at all by the proclaimed
right to privacy.
Rights language, furthermore, introduces a bias for quantitative moral
analysis, as though by a kind of weighing process one right could be seen
to supersede another. This bias could at times lead to simplism and to
the bypassing of the full methodic enterprise of ethics.
Withal, rights talk is not therefore useless. A proclaimed right encapsulates a principle and often does so with particularly persuasive force.
Rights can successfully state the claims of the individual in the face of
the collectivity. They can also signal with emphasis new ideals and
appreciations, such as therightsof the handicapped to meet their minimal
needs, the rights of children to proper representation, and the rights of
the aged to sexual expression.
These comments, then, are offered as cautionary in view of the state of
discourse in ethics and since EB is typically awash with rights talk. The
Bioethics article, for example, finds the argument made "thoroughly and
convincingly that natural objects (such as trees and streams) have rights
to life and health" (123). Lest the inner logic of this, molded onto the
juridical bias in American culture, lead to the establishment of Small
Claims Courts for Bushes and Brooks, it might be time to cool our
affection for rights as a moral factotum. Reverence for trees and streams
is good and perilously belated. But it need not be believed that if that
reverence is not translated into rights talk, it must perish from the face
of the earth. There are other categories for the expression of moral
evaluation. In the cause of categorial chastening, it is well to note the
view of Chung Sho Lo, a professor of philosophy and former member of
the UNESCO Commission, that there is no precise equivalent in Chinese
for our word "right." There is, of course, in China's traditions an ethics
of justice and mercy and gentleness.8 American ethical and political
discourse need not be silenced if our usage of "rights" be duly disciplined
and nuanced.
Let these criticisms and cautions not obscure the main import of this
review-article. EB is a sterling success. It should be on the shelf of all
those whose interests or work lead them to moral value considerations.
8

See Josef Pieper, Justice (New York: Pantheon, 1955) 116 n. 15.
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Also, a great circle is happily closing in EB. Science changed ethics by
changing the sphere of symbols and images in which ethics was done.
Rationality, critical thought, the appreciation of the prerogatives and
powers of the human mind all were enhanced by science and had an
impact on ethics. Now ethics is looking at science and awakening the
scientist to the deeper dimensions of science as a human enterprise,
conducted by and for humans on this good earth.
Marquette University
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